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The importance of land rental for overall economic 
development has long been recognized in theory, yet 
empirical evidence on the productivity and equity 
impacts of such markets and the extent to which they 
realize their potential has been scant. Representative data 
from China’s nine most important agricultural provinces 
illustrate the impact of rental markets on households’ 
economic strategies and welfare, and the productivity 
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of land use at the plot level. Although there are positive 
impacts in each of these dimensions, transaction 
costs constrain participation by many producers, thus 
preventing rental markets from attaining their full 
potential. The paper identifies factors that increase 
transaction costs and provides a rough estimate of the 
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Although the importance well-functioning factor markets for increasing productivity and fostering 
structural change has long been recognized, much of the literature on land rental is based on settings 
with historically unequal access to land and power. In such environments, land rental was important to 
help transfer land from large owners to landless workers or small landowners and thus achieve 
outcomes that were more efficient than wage-labor based cultivation. With traditional technology, 
high levels of risk, and lack of alternative opportunities, the scope for potential renters to bargain was 
limited especially where population growth led to a decrease in the amount of land available.  
However, economic growth, greater availability of off-farm employment, and the scope to add value 
by linking to supply chains and global markets all create opportunities to improve labor productivity 
in rural areas. Exploiting these fully will require well-functioning factor markets, including for land. It 
has long been noted that low-cost and flexible mechanisms to bring land to its most productive use 
can generate opportunities to transform rural economies and increase welfare (de Janvry et al. 2001). 
Compared to other options such as sale, land rental requires less capital outlay and provides greater 
inter-temporal flexibility while offering an opportunity to choose contractual forms to ameliorate the 
impact of imperfections in other markets and allowing even owners working off-farm to continue 
enjoying the benefits of land ownership (Otsuka and Hayami 1988). While the potential importance of 
rental markets in the context of structural change is well recognized in principle, empirical analysis is 
still limited, implying that it is difficult to assess the benefits from operation of such markets and the 
extent to which their performance may be constrained by policy. With near-universal land access and 
one of the fastest-growing economies in the world, China provides an opportunity to study an issue 
that is likely to be faced by countries in the not too far future.  
In this paper, we use the case of land rental in this country to explore the productivity- and welfare-
gains due to land rental, the factors determining participation, and the extent to which it lives up to its 
potential in fostering structural change. Information on the other party in land market transactions and 
the productivity of plots before and after having been transferred in the market allows inferences on 
the benefits from land rental in terms of diversification of income sources, household welfare, and 
agricultural productivity. A model of producers with given innate levels of agricultural ability, an 
exogenous non-agricultural wage rate, and transaction costs of land rental provides a basis for 
predictions on the impact of changed availability of non-agricultural employment opportunities and 
the level of transaction costs on land markets, occupational choice, agricultural productivity, and the 
distribution of income that can then be tested empirically.  
Descriptive data point towards a surprisingly large effect of land rental on productive efficiency, with 
an estimated net revenue increase of almost 60% -one-third of which accrues to landlords and two 
thirds to tenants- thus providing a basis for increasing both parties’ welfare. The importance of land rental for non-agricultural employment, mostly through migration, is illustrated by the fact that 57% 
of sample landlords had their main income from agriculture before renting their land but only 17% 
continued to do so thereafter. Despite the economic benefits from land rental, local regulations and 
tenure insecurity increase the associated transaction cost, thus constraining participation by some 
households and the associated welfare gains. Respondents’ subjective perceptions and the fact that -
despite the significant productivity losses entailed in such a priori limitation of the set of possible 
transaction partners- a large part of them transact exclusively with relatives support this notion. 
Econometric analysis based on an ordered probit model with variable thresholds allows not only 
identification of factors conducive to better land rental market operation but also appreciation of their 
relative importance. We find strong support for a factor equalization effect of land rentals whereby, as 
the better educated join the non-agricultural labor force, the poor and less educated will be able to 
gain by renting in additional land. A growth effect is visible from the fact that rental markets tend to 
be more active in area with more off-farm economic opportunities. Finally, although there is evidence 
that transaction costs and regulations have a statistically significant effect on land market participation, 
econometric estimates suggest that the magnitude of this effect is comparatively small and instead 
migration and occupational change emerge as key drivers of land rental.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section two motivates the paper by summarizing how the emphasis 
on productivity effects of contract choice may need to be complemented by analysis of participation 
decisions, summarizes the evolution of China’s land tenure system, and describes available data. This 
is followed by evidence on the impact of rental markets on occupational choice, income levels of both 
parties, productivity effects, and the extent to which rental may fully exhaust available opportunities. 
Section three uses a household model to derive propositions on factor equalization, transaction cost, 
and growth effects of rental and to chart an empirical strategy for estimating these. This is followed 
by presentation and discussion of the econometric results. Section four concludes by drawing out 
implications for policy in China and other countries and by identifying areas for follow-up research.  
2. Background and motivation  
To motivate our analysis, we place the evolution of land tenure and land markets in China in the 
context of the literature, highlighting that the traditional emphasis on land rental as a means to 
equalize highly unequal factor endowments and on the efficiency properties of different contractual 
arrangements in such markets has limited applicability to China. We then use our data to describe 
general features of the rural economy, the emergence of rental markets and their large impact on 
diversification of income sources, household welfare, and productivity of land use to set the stage for 
a more in-depth discussion of the conceptual underpinnings of land rental.  
2.1 Evolution of land tenure and land markets in China  
  3A large literature on contract choice discusses properties of rental contracts in an environment 
characterized by multiple market imperfections and (implicitly) unequal ownership distribution of 
land which rental markets help to equalize. Considerable emphasis has been on efforts to reconcile the 
widespread incidence of sharecropping in many parts of the world with the prediction that this 
contractual form to be associated with large inefficiencies. Many studies have focused on identifying 
conditions under which, in an environment characterized by risk and uncertainty, wealth constraints, 
and moral hazard, sharecropping could be a second best choice that will be difficult to improve upon 
unless key environmental parameters change (Shetty 1988, Basu 1992, Otsuka et al. 1992, Laffont 
and Matoussi 1995, Banerjee et al. 2002, Dubois 2002). Considerable effort has been expanded to 
empirically quantify the extent to which share contracts will lead to productivity losses (Shaban 1987, 
Otsuka and Hayami 1988, Otsuka et al. 1992, Pender and Fafchamps 2006).  
Although some contributions consider factors affecting tenants’ and landlords’ incentives to enter into 
specific contracts, a main focus is on contract properties and the decision to rent is often taken as 
given. In the context of economic development, more and more countries are expected to transfer 
labor out of the agricultural sector and rely on other sectors as the mainstay of their economy. How 
the rural sector deals with this will affect the rate and nature of economic growth (World Bank 2007). 
Complementing analysis of contractual forms with an assessment of the factors affecting functioning 
as well as productivity-and welfare impacts of rental markets will thus become of increasing interest 
and policy relevance. To provide the necessary background, we briefly review China’s land history. 
Before the communist revolution, most of China’s farmers were poor tenants or owners of small plots 
of land. After taking over, the communist government confiscated large landlords’ holdings and 
distributed land to households on an egalitarian basis (Prosterman et al. 1990). In the 1950s, a policy 
of collectivization that required farmers to surrender land to collectives was adopted, with negative 
consequences for output and rural welfare (Putterman and Skillman 1993, Yao 1999, Lin and Yang 
2000). To increase production, the 1978 Household Responsibility System (HRS) made households 
residual claimants to output, setting off tremendous increases in output and productivity (McMillan et 
al. 1989, Lin 1992).
1 Structural change since then has been dramatic; agriculture’s employment share 
is estimated to have dropped from more than 70% in 1978 to less than 50% by 2000 (Johnson 2002), 
in a process of structural change that is expected to continue in the future.  
Instead of a big-bang reform, the land tenure system underpinning these changes evolved gradually in 
response to needs. In 1978, villages started issuing 15-year land use contracts to farmers. However, 
these contracts often remained verbal and rarely protected against administrative land reallocations 
(Rozelle et al. 2002). Land transfers were still expected to be administered by village leaders (Kung 
                                                 
1 In urban areas, land was either allocated by the state or long term leases were acquired by private users upon payment of a fee. Land 
acquisition provided advantages by giving owners the ability to participate in the secondary land market, use the land as mortgage, and rent 
it to others. Between 1993 and 1998, the amount transacted annually increased from about 11,000 to almost 1.1 million ha and the amount of 
land mortgaged rose from about 1,000 to 884,000 ha (Ho and Lin 2003). 
  4and Liu 1997),
2 whose failure to capitalize on rapidly increasing opportunities led to productive 
inefficiency (Benjamin and Brandt 2002). Initially on an informal basis, decentralized land transfers 
thus complemented and gradually overtook administrative mechanisms (Yao 2000, Kung 2002). Still, 
renting out of land by a migrant or a person engaging in local off-farm activities could be perceived as 
a signal that the land was no longer required and could be subjected to administrative reallocation 
(Yang 1997, Brandt et al. 2004). Higher tenure security therefore emerged as precondition for more 
active rental markets to foster evolution of a vibrant off-farm economy.  
To respond to this, and in line with results from local land tenure experiments (Kung 2006), legal 
measures to strengthen tenure security were put in place, first through the 1998 Land Management 
Law and then the 2003 Rural Land Contracting Law. In response, land rental markets, which had been 
virtually non-existent by the mid-1990s, emerged rapidly, with participation rates above 10% in 2001 
(Deininger and Jin 2005). Migration and non-farm employment motivate an increasing number of 
households to move out of agriculture (Rozelle et al. 1999b, de Brauw et al. 2000), with far-reaching 
social and economic implications (Zhao 2002). China thus provides an ideal setting to explore impacts 
of land rental on productivity and household welfare and factors determining participation in such 
markets in settings where non-agricultural growth and differential ability are emerging as main drivers 
of adjustments through factor markets (Liu et al. 1998, Zhai and Wang 2002).  
2.2 Data and descriptive evidence  
Our empirical investigation is based on a 4-period panel (2001-2004) of almost 8,000 households in 
about 800 villages that is representative of China’s 9 agriculturally most important provinces.
3 
Household level information is from the ongoing consumption survey conducted by the Rural Survey 
Team of China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) that includes detail on demography, assets, 
income, expenditure, agricultural production, and land market participation and is generally 
considered to be a very high quality survey (Jalan and Ravallion 1999). These data are complemented 
by a village level schedule, answered by local leaders based on administrative records, that obtains 
information on levels of income, migration, key endowments, institutional arrangements (e.g. no. of 
land use certificates issued) and land use regulations and land market restrictions from 1999 onwards. 
Finally, a supplemental questionnaire administered to households involved in land transactions elicits 
information on contractual details, current and past occupation and income levels by the respondent 
and his or her partner, and revenue from agricultural production on the land plot before it was rented.
4  
                                                 
2 Exchanges of land within the village had been prohibited before the 1986 Land Management Law legalized them. Transfers to outsiders 
remained illegal until allowed in 1998, although without clarifying specific modalities to be followed (Li 2003). 
3 Earlier analysis of rental markets in China assessed differences in outcomes between rental markets and government reallocation whereas 
here the emphasis is on the size of the efficiency impact of land rental and factors that could prevent market operation. Correspondingly, in 
this paper determinants of renting in and out are modeled and estimated jointly rather than through simple probit models as was done earlier. 
Moreover, data coverage is greatly expanded, covering the China’s 9 key agricultural provinces over a 4-year period rather than just three 
poor southwestern ones for a much shorter panel.  
4 The fact that these data rely on recall and in part refer to income or productivity by another household may lead to concern about bias. For 
panel households, checking the consistency of recall against earlier income levels pointed towards some noise (see below). In cases where 
both parties were present, cross checks conducted during the pre-test of the survey instrument pointed towards a high level of consistency 
  5Descriptive statistics for key variables at the national and regional level as reported in table 1,
5 point 
towards differences in income, migration, endowments, and local policy across regions and highlight 
the increasing importance of land markets. While primary education has become almost universal, 
52% and 18% of households have a head with secondary or high school education, respectively. 
Schooling attainment is lower in the Southwest (46% with secondary and 9% with high school), 
followed by the Center (45% and 18%, respectively) and the North and Coast regions. The mean per 
capita land endowment is 1.68 mu,
6 a figure that ranges from 1.13 in the Southwest to 2.30 in the 
Northeast. The amount of non-land assets, about 27,000 Y on average,
7 varies across provinces, from 
36,000 in the Coast to 17,000 in the Southwest, the country’s poorest region. With a contribution of 
about 58% to total income, agriculture remains the most important source of income overall, ranging 
from almost-two thirds (63%) in the Southwest to slightly less than half of the income in the Coast. 
Not surprisingly, as land had been distributed on an egalitarian basis in the 1980s and many villages 
had conducted land reallocations to respond to demographic changes since then (Rozelle et al. 2002), 
the Gini coefficient of the land ownership distribution is, with 0.41, lower than the 0.75 or 0.89 found 
in India or Brazil (Deininger and Squire 1998). 13% and 10% of producers rented in or out, 
respectively during 2002-2004. Still, most rental transactions remained informal; 60% of participants 
reported to have a contract, less than 10% of contracts were in writing and 75% open ended while the 
remaining 25% were for about 3 years. Interestingly, almost 40% of producers (54% in the Southwest 
and 59% in the Northeast) rent in from a relative. With participation rates of 21% and 15%, land 
rental is most active in the Central and Southwest regions which also have the highest levels of 
migration, suggesting links between these phenomena (Kung 2002). 18% of households -from 25% in 
the Center to 10% in the Northeast- include at least one migrant and while 17% of migrants crossed 
provincial boundaries in the Coast, more than two thirds did so in the Center. Institutional 
arrangements likely to be of relevance for rental decisions differ across regions. While the 1998 land 
law mandates issuance of land use certificates, only 81% -from 74% in the Northeast to 92% in the 
Southwest- had certificates. In 2001, about 10% of villages, from 4% in the Southwest to 16% in the 
Coast, had a policy allowing the village to take back land left uncultivated for one season and 14% 
(from 26% in the Coast to 5% in the Southwest) prohibited land rental to outsiders.  
Splitting the sample by type of land market participation (appendix table 1) illustrates such trends. 
With per capita land endowments of 2.1 mu for ‘landlords’ vs. 1.5 mu for tenants, rental equalizes 
factor ratios. Also, as ‘landlords’ rely less on agricultural income than tenants (53% vs. 65%) but 
                                                                                                                                                        
between information obtained from the tenant and the landlord. This is not surprising as potential contracting partners have strong incentives 
to obtain good information on the productive potential of specific plots they are going to rent or the economic situation of potential partners. 
While there may be some residual noise in the data, this strongly argues against potential systematic bias.  
5 The four regions are defined as follows: North and Northeast includes Liaoning and Henan provinces, Coastal Zhejiang and Shandong, the 
Center Henan and Hubei, and the Southwest Hunan, Sichuan and Guizhou provinces. In table 1, information in the two top panels is from 
NBS’ household survey while panels 2 and 3 are based on the follow-up survey of those renting land and panel 5 on our village survey.  
6 One mu equals 1/15
th of a hectare. 
7 At the time of the survey, the exchange rate was approximately 8 Y to 1 US dollar.  
  6derive higher parts of income from migration/transfers (24% vs. 19%), wages (12% vs. 7%), and non-
farm self-employment (11% vs. 9%) land rental facilitates diversification of the occupational structure.  
2.3 Impacts of rental market participation 
Although the above is suggestive, robust inferences on occupational shifts and welfare or productivity 
effects of land rental markets require analysis of changes for the same household or plot over time. Its 
shortcomings notwithstanding, our supplemental survey of rental participants and their partners can 
provide such evidence.
 We focus on changes in main occupation to gains in income and productivity 
and evidence on whether or not land markets realize their full potential.
8  
Changes in main income sources by households renting out land (table 2) point to land rental as basis 
for income diversification. Before renting out land, the vast majority (57%) of these households relied 
on agriculture, followed by local non-farm employment (23%) and migration (20%). The ability to 
engage in land rental completely changed this; after renting out land, the share of households deriving 
their main income from migration had increased by 35 points to 55%, followed by 29% in local off-
farm employment, and only 17% who remain in agricultural production, i.e., a total of 40 points less 
than before land rental. Inspection of the transition matrix highlights that virtually all of the change 
was due to households shifting out of full-time agriculture to migration (33 points) and local non-farm 
employment (8 points), complemented by some shift from non-farm employment to migration (3%). 
Levels of net per capita income in broad categories before and after land rental for those renting out 
and in, respectively, provide a better understanding of welfare effects from land rental. The top panel 
of table 3 shows that rental participation allowed many landlords to increase their incomes: 45% 
moved up by at least one category, 54% remained in the same category, and less than 1% moved 
down. While the need to rely on ranges rather than exact figures makes it impossible to compute the 
impact on average income; the share of landlord households with a per capita income of less than 
1,500 Y dropped by 20 points, from 30% to 10%, consistent with evidence that those with low asset 
endowments engage in migration (Deininger and Jin 2006). The share of households with incomes 
above 3,000 Y increased from 26% to 47% of the total. The transition matrix for tenants’ income 
(bottom panel of table 3) before and after land rental also signals improvement; although some two 
thirds remained in the same income bracket, about one third moved up and only about 1% moved 
down.
 With the majority of impacts concentrated at the bottom of the distribution, the distributional 
impact was unambiguously positive: the share of households in the poorest group (< 1,500 Y) 
declined from 21% to 10%, a 5 point decrease is observed in the share of households in the 1,500-
3,000 Y bracket, and the share of those obtaining more than 3,000 Y increased from 27% to 42%.  
                                                 
8 Note that the evidence provided is cumulative. While it is very easy to give the sector of employment, estimates of income categories or 
productivity are likely to be more noisy.  
  7While rent-out households may have moved out, tenants will remain in the sample, allowing us to 
independently check the above results and to derive a more robust measure of the income change due 
to land rental. We do so by running a household fixed effect regression of net income (after rental fees) 
on area rented in and year dummies to control for time varying factors, we find that, while year 
dummies are highly significant, renting in increases incomes for the same household by about 10% (t 
of 4.56). Concerns that reliance on land markets would have a negative equity impact as compared to 
making land available “for free” through administrative means thus have little empirical foundation. 
As any sustained income gains beyond zero-sum redistribution need to be supported by higher levels 
of productivity, closer scrutiny of this variable will be of interest. Data on net revenues excluding 
family labor from a plot before and after it had been rented support the hypotheses of significant 
improvements in productivity through land rental (Table 3). With a gain of 267 or 283 Y/mu 
amounting to an increase in net revenues of 84% or 83%,
9 figures obtained from tenants and landlords, 
respectively, are surprisingly consistent.
10 With rental payments inclusive of taxes amounting to about 
90 Y/mu, about two thirds of the surplus from land rental accrues to tenants and one third to those 
renting out. With a mean of 3 mu per land transaction, the increase in net income for the tenant due to 
rental market participation amounts to about 550 Y. Although the difference used above nets out 
unobservable but time invariant plot characteristics such as soil quality, the estimated productivity 
impact of land rental will be biased upwards by any independent changes in productivity, e.g. due to 
technical change. To adjust this, we pool data for changes in net income at the plot level as reported 
by rental market participants with the difference in net revenue between 2001 and 2004 per mu (Δy) 
for the 6100 households who remained in autarky throughout the period (essentially treating the entire 
household as one plot), to obtain a sample of 7,968 observations.
11 Letting R
in and R
out be dummies 
for renting in and out and D a vector of regional dummies, the coefficients α1 and α2 in a regression of 
the form Δy =α0+ α1 R
in + α2R
out+βD provide an estimate of net productivity increases due to rental. 
With values of 186 Y/mu for α1 and 180 Y/mu for α2 (t-statistics of 4.75 and 3.24; R
2 of 0.56), 
estimates suggest productivity increase of slightly below 60% due to land rental.  
                                                
To assess whether rental fully capitalized on available opportunities, we use households’ subjective 
perception of constraints and systematic differences in productivity changes between land rented to 
relatives and non-relatives. Concerning perceptions, households were asked whether they ever wanted 
to rent out (or in) more than they could obtain in the market and whether they feel confident that in 
the future they will be able to use rental to fully adjust to the desired level of operational land holding. 
 
9 If both apply equivalent amounts of family labor, the change in net revenue is equivalent to an increase in productivity. As, with 81 versus 
91 days per mu, renters actually spend slightly less time on agricultural activities than autarkic cultivators, this assumption seems justified.  
10 Recall that, in cases where the landlord migrated out, asking the tenant is the only feasible way of obtaining such information. As we are 
using brackets and broad job categories, information obtained from both partners in the pre-test for cases where doing so was feasible was 
internally very consistent.  
11 If higher managerial ability by rent-in households imply a systematic difference in the rate, rather than just the level of productivity 
growth, this estimate may still be biased. As information on agricultural inputs is available only at the household level, it was not possible to 
conduct the more appropriate comparison between changes in net revenue for owned and rented in plots by the same household.  
  8Responses, in the bottom panel of table 3, suggest friction on both sides of the market. Almost 40% 
had unsatisfied demand at some point in the past and 12% wanted to supply more land than the 
market could absorb.
12 The share of households who are “not confident” about being able to rent in 
their desired amount is, with 45%, slightly above the share of those rationed in the past and 23% are 
concerned to not be able to rent out the desired amount of land in the future.  
If partner choice in rental markets is guided only by productivity considerations, there should be no 
systematic difference in productivity changes due to rental between plots rented to relatives and non-
relatives. However, tenure insecurity and a perceived greater scope to either enforce contracts with 
relatives or conceal rentals with the former and thus avoid being caught in violation of existing 
regulations and facing the consequence of possible land loss could be a reason for households entering 
into contracts with relatives with lower productivity as the “price” they are willing to pay for these 
advantages. Comparing productivity changes between plots rented to relatives and non-relatives (table 
3, cols 2 and 3) indeed points towards large and significant differences, with productivity gains from 
renting to non-relatives almost 80% higher than from transactions involving relatives. Of course, part 
of the gap could be explained by altruistic motives or informational imperfections rather than policy 
constraints. To gain further insight into this, we include actual policies into our econometric analysis.  
3. Conceptual framework, econometric approach, and key results  
Although the descriptive evidence suggests a positive impact of rental markets, identifying factors 
that encourage or discourage participation in such markets and assessing their importance requires 
econometric analysis. Following the presentation of a household model of rental market participation, 
we discuss the ordered probit framework for estimation and some of the results relevant in our context.   
3.1 Conceptual framework  
To capture factors affecting participation in land rental markets, we use a simple model of agricultural 
production. Let household i be endowed with fixed amounts of labor  i L  and land  i A , and a given 
level of agricultural ability  i α  (Carter and Yao 2002). Agricultural production follows a production 
function f(αi,,lia,Ai) with standard properties, i.e. f’>0, f’’<0 with respect to all arguments and flA>0.  
Labor supervision constraints and the egalitarian distribution of land endowments imply limited scope 
for emergence of agricultural labor markets (Binswanger et al. 1995). Households thus allocate their 
labor between farming on own or leased land li,a and off-farm employment li,o at an exogenously given 
wage w. We abstract from credit market imperfections, noting that these can be overcome through 
                                                 
12  One of the reasons is likely to be that, despite legal provisions to the contrary, land reallocations by village leaders continued at 
surprisingly high rates (Deininger et al. 2006). At the same time, more than 80% indicated that the 2003 rural land contracting law (RLCL) 
has made transfers of land through the market easier, although it did not fully eliminate constraints to participation. 
  9appropriately structured rental contracts.
 13 While f(αi,,li,a,Ai) is subject to constant return to scale (e.g. 
 in the Cobb-Douglass case) but that, as ability is not tradable,   
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In the above setting, households’ decision variables are li,a and li,o, the amount of labor devoted to 
farming and wage employment, and the amount of land to be farmed, which implies the amount of 
land rented in or rented out. Renting of land incurs transaction costs which can be different for renting 
in (TC
in) and for renting out (TC
out ). Standard elements of transaction cost such as the expense of 
acquiring information on potential partners and negotiating and enforcing contracts affect both parties 
equally. As 
 the risk of land loss, most likely because rental is understood as a signal that could trigger 
land redistribution (Rozelle et al. 2002) is of relevance only for landlords, i.e. it will affect only TC
out. 
Letting transaction costs be proportional to the amount of land transacted,
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in I where, in addition to the variables defined earlier, p is the price of agricultural goods,  is an 
indicator for renting in (1 for rent-in, and 0 otherwise) and 
out I  is a similarly defined indicator for 
renting out (1 for rent-out and 0 otherwise). Assuming that (2) holds with equality, the optimal 
choices, li,a
* and Ai
* solve the first order conditions (FOCs)  
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Comparative statics based on equations (3)-(6) allow us to derive three propositions relating to factor 
equalization, transaction cost, and growth effects that provide the basis for our empirical hypotheses 
as follows (see the appendix for detailed proofs).  
Proposition 1: The amount of land rented in (out) is strictly increasing (decreasing) in households’ 
relative agricultural ability, αi, and strictly decreasing (increasing) in their land endowment  i A . Land 
                                                 
13 The notion that households are able to structure rental contracts flexibly to overcome liquidity constraints is supported by the fact that, 
according to our data, 86% of contracts at the national level, and more than 90% in the poor Southwestern provinces, involve rental payment 
at harvest time.  
14 Although the relationship between transaction costs and area transacted is not necessarily fully proportional, we treat transaction costs for 
either side of the markets as variable cost, following other examples in the literature (Kimura et al. 2007)  
  10rental will transfer land to efficient, but land-poor producers thereby contributing to higher levels of 
productivity and more efficient factor use in the economy and inclusion of (relative) ability implies a 
role for land markets even in environments with egalitarian land ownership distributions.  
Proposition 2: The presence of transaction costs defines two critical levels of ability αl(TC
out, ..) and 
αu(TC
in, ..) such that households with ability αi∈[αl, αu] will remain in autarky. Any increase in TC
in 
or TC
out will expand the autarky range, thus reducing the number of producers participating in rental 
markets and the number of efficiency-enhancing land transactions. Compared to a situation with no 
transaction cost, this will decrease productivity and social welfare.  
Proposition 3: Increases of the exogenously given wage for off-farm employment will imply that 
higher amounts of land are transacted in rental markets as households with low agricultural ability 
who join the off-farm labor market will supply more land. This “growth effect” will lead to a decrease 
in the equilibrium rental rate which will prompt those with high-ability (who specialize in agricultural 
production) to rent in more land.  
3.2 Estimation strategy  
Testing the above predictions quantitatively requires measures of agricultural ability and transaction 
costs. To obtain a measure for the former, we use the time variation in the data to estimate a 
household fixed effect Cobb-Douglas production function.
15 Let technology be represented by  
) exp( ) exp(
4 3 2 1 t X K L A Q ijt ijt ijt ijt j i ijt φ α α
θ θ θ θ + =       (9) 
where Qijt is the value of agricultural output produced by household i in village j in year t; Aijt, Lijt and 
Kijt, Xijt are total cultivated area, labor for crop production, value of agricultural assets, and amounts of 
chemical fertilizer, organic manure, pesticides, and seeds used in production, θ1, θ2, θ3, and θ4 are 
technical coefficients to be estimated, αj is a time invariant village level efficiency parameter that 
reflects, among others, access to markets, infrastructure, and other factors that change only slowly 
such as climate, αi is the time invariant household fixed effect which serves as our measure of ability, 
and t is a time dummy so that exp(φt) measures productivity changes over time. To estimate (9), we 
take logarithms on both sides, add an iid error term, and let αij = αi +αj to obtain  
qijt = αij +θ1aijt + θ2 lijt + θ3 kijt + θ4 xijt + φt + εijt     (10) 
where a, l, and k denote logarithms of A, L, and K with appropriate subscripts. Multiple observations 
per household allow to subtract means. Denoting demeaned variables by ~ (i.e.  ij ijt ijt q q q − = ~ ) yields 
                                                 
15 As information is aggregated at the household level, we need to rely on inter-temporal variation to identify household fixed effects. The 
fact that, for households engaging in land rental, we are unable to separate rented from owned plots could also constitute a source of bias. If, 
as is commonly assumed, productivity on rented plots is lower than on owned ones, this would impart a downward bias on estimated ability 
of tenants while leaving estimated ability of landlords unaffected, implying that the estimated coefficient in table 5 would be a lower bound. 
As out of the 8,451 households for which information is available continuously for all 4 years, only 262 rented in land for 3 or more years, 
another way of eliminating bias is to estimate ability only for the sample with at least two observations of production on owned land only. 
Results from doing so are reported in column 3 of table 5 and discussed in the text accordingly.  
  11ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt t x k l a q ε φ θ θ θ θ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
4 3 2 1 + + + + + =      (11) 
We can then estimate θs and φ to recover an composite efficiency parameter αij  composed of 
households’ idiosyncratic farming ability and unobserved village characteristics. Noting that the 
village effect can be defined as the average of all household fixed effects in the village, i.e. 
 (Mundlak 1961) allows us to obtain an estimate of ability for each producer in the 
sample by subtracting 
∑ =
i
j ij j n / ) ˆ ( ˆ α α
j α ˆ from  ij α ˆ .  
A second empirical issue is to specify an appropriate econometric framework for transaction costs and 
parameterize it. According to our model, rental market participation will depend on the households’ 
endowments of land ( A ) and family labor ( L ), their assets (K), and opportunities for off-farm 
employment (O). Let g(α, A, L , K, O) be a household’s net earning function that includes all farm 
and non-farm earning activities except the net rental income including transaction costs for market 
participants, and g’(a, A , L ,K,O) be the first derivative of g(a, A, L , K, O) with respect to land 
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where A
*
i denotes the optimal operational land size. This switching regime model can be estimated 
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While similar approaches to market participation have been taken by other studies (Goetz 1992, Key 
et al. 2000, Carter and Yao 2002, Bellemare and Barrett 2006), our approach differs from these in that 
we look at participation only
16 and specify thresholds as functions of, among others, policy variables 
and do not require symmetry of these effects. In terms of our model, this is justified by the notion that 
certain policy variables (e.g. tenure security) will affect transaction costs r(.) for renting out but not 
renting in and are unlikely to affect individual producers’ marginal product g’(.).  
Under the assumption that g’(α, A ,L ,K,O), r(TC
in) and r(TC
out) are linear, this can be expressed as 
  g’(α,  A , L ,K,O)= β0 + β1α + β2 A  + β3L  + β4K + β5O     (14) 
r(TC
in) = δ0 + δ1V+δ2S         (15) 
                                                 
16 The fact that information on the amount of land rented was not included in our data before 2004 and is quite noisy even for this year 
precludes us from modeling the quantity of land transacted conditional on rental market participation.   
  12 r(TC
out) = η0 +η1V+η2S        (16).  
The switching regression or ordered probit model defined by these equations is estimated by full 
information maximum likelihood. Households’ endowments of land and labor are represented by the 
total amount of land to which they have use rights, the head’s age, and the number of family members 
14 to 60 years of age. K is represented by the value of assets at the beginning of the year. Village per 
capita income and the head’s level of education are used to approximate O.
 17  
The upper and lower threshold functions r(TC
in) and r(TC
out) will be affected by economic (V) and 
institutional factors (S).
 The former are approximated by the per capita land endowment in the village, 
the share of adults in the village who, had migrated out of the province in the 1999-2001 period. The 
latter include whether the village allows rentals with non-residents, whether there is a rule mandating 
that land left uncultivated for one season be taken back by authorities, and whether households have 
land use certificates to document their land rights.  
The rationale for including these factors is intuitive: Out-migration increases supply of land available 
for rent, thereby reducing search costs for potential tenants. Higher village level land endowments 
will reduce transaction costs for renting-in but also reduce numbers of potential tenants. Limitations 
on renting to outsiders will increase the costs of renting out but, by forcing landlords to rent to locals 
instead, may make it easier to find land to rent in. While reducing tenure security, rules requiring non-
cultivated land to be returned to the village may increase supply of land to rental. Land use certificates 
should reduce the risk that rented land is lost to village-wide redistribution and thus encourage 
potential landlords to rent out.  
3.3 Econometric results  
Appendix table 2 reports results from estimating the Cobb-Douglas production function, for OLS and 
fixed effects. Coefficients on key inputs (land, labor and material costs) are all positive and very 
significant, implying that land and purchased inputs including seed, fertilizer, pesticides, and 
irrigation are key determinants of output. Coefficients on year dummies (not reported) also point 
towards an increase in productivity of 12-14 percentage points over the 4-year period. After netting 
out village means, our estimate of agricultural ability is distributed between -2.0 and 2.10 with 90% of 
the households concentrated between -0.65 and 0.8. The implied differences in output are large; at the 
mean of all other variables, an exogenous increase of ability from the mean to the 90% point (i.e. from 
0 to 0.8) would increase output by 122%.
18  
Table 5 displays results from the ordered probit model with coefficients from the marginal product 
equation in the top panel and the lower and upper bound equations to determine the cutoffs between 
                                                 
17 Equation (13) implies that the probability of falling into any rental regime is jointly determined by the functions g and r. Together with the 
fact that variables can not appear in the threshold and the main equations, our main criterion for whether to include a variable in the main or 
the threshold equations is whether this variable is expected to affect lower and upper bounds differentially or not.  
18 The corresponding physical value is an increase of 590 Y/mu. In view of this, the increases in output for the same plot reported earlier do 
not seem implausibly large and could be due to differences in ability.  
  13leasing out and autarky and autarky and leasing in, respectively, in the middle and bottom panels. We 
discuss evidence for factor equalization, transaction cost, and growth effects. In each case, we 
illustrate in table 6 the magnitude of the participation effect by reporting the change in the probability 
of a household falling into one of the three regimes due to a counterfactual exogenous shift of a given 
variable from the sample mean to the maximum.
19  
The large and significant coefficients on households’ endowment with land (negative) and labor 
(positive) suggest a strong factor equalization effect whereby, by transferring land factor from land-
abundant and labor poor households to those with little land and large amounts of labor, land rental 
helps equalize access to traditional factors of production. Inclusion of ability, while reducing sample 
size by about 1,000, does not affect significance or magnitude of these variables but highlights that 
non-traditional factors are of importance as more able producers are more likely to rent in land (col. 2). 
Also, negative coefficients on age squared and households’ education and initial assets imply that, by 
shifting land to younger, less affluent, and less educated producers, the factor equalization effect of 
land rental extends to non-traditional factors. There is thus little reason for concern about land rental 
promoting undesirable land concentration or reducing land access by the poor.  
Comparing the impact of an exogenous change in a given independent variable from the sample mean 
to its maximum on estimated probabilities for participation in different regimes provides additional 
insights, in addition to reinforcing the relevance of non-traditional factors.
 While increasing the land 
endowment would result in a 40% increase in the probability of renting out (but only a 12% reduction 
in the probability of renting in), a similar shift of ability would increase the probability of renting in 
by 27% while reducing that of renting out by 7 points. Assets are of lower importance -with a shift to 
the maximum predicted to result in only changes of some 2 percentage points in either direction.  
The variables in the lower and upper bound equations point towards significant transaction cost 
effects. We note that activity in land rental markets is higher in locations with higher levels of past 
migration, that greater tenure security will increase supply of land to rental markets but not demand, 
and that local regulations affecting the cost of transferring land will affect producers’ entry into rental 
markets. As it reduces the amount of labor available, higher village level migration is estimated to 
increase supply of land to rental and the demand for such land.
20 As expected, overall availability of 
land in the village reduces the propensity to rent out and makes it easier to rent in land.  
The significance of the coefficient on having a land certificate in the lower but not the upper bound 
equation is consistent with the notion that limited levels of tenure security constrain households from 
supplying land to rental markets and that issuance of an ‘official’ document codifying their use rights 
                                                 
19 Using equations (13)-(15), it is straightforward to compute the changes in the probability of being in a specific regime due to exogenous 
changes in independent variables. For the rent in regime, Prob(rent-in)=Prob(ε>δS-βX)=1-Φ(δS-βX) where as defined above, S is the vector 
of transaction cost variables X contains variables affecting the marginal product of land (i.e. α, A, L, K, O), and Φ is the cumulative density 
of the standard normal distribution. Thus, ∂Prob(rent-in)/ ∂S= -ф((δS-βX)δ and   ∂Prob(rent-in)/ ∂X= ф((δS-βX)β, where ф is the density of 
the standard normal distribution. Equivalent formuas can be applied to renting out.  
20 This is consistent with the notion that cash constraints, which remittances may alleviate, are not a key factor affecting rental participation.  
  14may make them more confident. By the same token, village-level rules that limit rentals to outsiders 
are estimated to be a significant factor reducing households’ propensity to supply land to rental 
markets although they have no discernible impact on participation on the demand side. Surprisingly, 
land use regulations that allow village leaders to confiscate land that has not been utilized for one 
season are estimated to have a very significant impact on the propensity for rental market participation 
on either the supply or the demand side.  
Although policy-related variables in the upper and lower bound equations have the expected sign and 
are significant at conventional levels, the predicted impact on behavior is small; according to our 
simulations, a change the dummy from 0 to 1 will change the probability of renting out by about 1 
percentage point for having a certificate as well as leasing restrictions and by about 3 points for taking 
back land left without cultivation. As expected, the impact on renting in is much lower and often 
insignificant. Comparison to the large increases in participation probabilities 18% and 16% for renting 
in and 6% and 4% for renting out- predicted due to changes in migration and availability in village 
land, respectively, implies that land rental is driven largely by outside opportunities and that local 
policies, albeit significant, are not a major constraint to better land market functioning and growth.  
The notion that availability of other economic opportunities is the main driver of observed increases 
in supply of land to rental markets is supported by the highly significant migration effect whereby 
higher levels of out-migration increase activity in rental markets and households’ propensity to rent 
out and rent in, thereby allowing those who participate in migration to rent out their land and at the 
same time for those who have comparative advantage and higher productivity in agriculture to obtain 
increased amounts of land. As indicated in table 6, shifting a household from a village with average 
share of migrants in village to villages with the highest share of migrants in village would increase the 
propensity to rent in and rent out by 18% and 6% respectively. To appreciate implied effects, note that 
the share of migrants in the labor force from less than 5% in 1988 to 10% in 1995 (Rozelle et al. 
1999a) and about 17%, or a total of 124.6 million in 2000 (Taylor et al. 2003, Liang and Ma 2004). 
With an expected further increase in the flow of migrants to 200 million by 2020, most of which from 
in rural areas (Cai and Wang 2003), rental is likely to increase. Indeed, land rental appears to be a 
critical element of the “development ladder” by which occupational structure in a given location shifts 
from migration to micro- and large enterprises while simultaneously pushing out the frontier to start a 
similar cycle in more remote regions (Mohapatra et al. 2006). 
4. Conclusion and policy implications 
With an increasing body of literature testifying to the importance of land rental in Africa (Benin et al. 
2005, Chimhowu and Woodhouse 2006, Baland et al. 2007, Deininger et al. 2007a) but also in other 
regions (Deininger et al. 2003, Gine 2005, Vranken and Swinnen 2006, Marsh et al. 2006, Masterson 
  152007), few studies have analyzed its impact and whether it fully realizes existing potential. Doing so 
for China provides analytical and empirical insights.  
Empirically, we find that gains in productivity of land use through land rental in a growing economy 
can be large, with estimated productivity increases of some 60%. These translate into improvements 
of 25% in tenants’ welfare and, by facilitating occupational diversification, even larger increases in 
landlords’ income.
21 There is no evidence that rental puts the poor at a disadvantage; to the contrary 
the factor equalization and growth effects found here imply that, as better educated individuals join 
the non-agricultural labor force, the poor and less educated can gain by renting in additional land. 
Supply of land to rental markets increases with households’ wealth, their access to non-agricultural 
opportunities, and development. While transaction costs, some due to local restrictions, significantly 
reduce rental participation, the magnitudes involved are minuscule compared to broader structural 
factors. Higher non-agricultural wages and well-functioning rental markets thus create a pathway for 
development to complement traditional avenues of land-related investment and links to markets.  
Comparing salient features of land distribution and agricultural productivity between China and other 
regions helps identify broader lessons and areas for follow-up research. In Africa, complex property 
rights and tenure insecurity often restrict land-related investment (Goldstein and Udry 2006) and limit 
the willingness to rent out, something also encountered in many Eastern European countries (Lerman 
et al. 2002). To ensure such incentives, ways to increase security of land ownership and institutional 
arrangements allowing (longer-term) land transfers will be needed. Although high inequality of the 
land ownership distribution, together with non-agricultural growth, imply that opportunities for land 
rental in South Asia and Latin America are higher than in China, explicit restrictions on land rental 
(Deininger et al. 2007b) or limited tenure security (Macours 2004) significantly reduce land rental. To 
quantify potential and actual impact of better land rental markets and their link to the emergence of 
non-agricultural employment, in these settings, it will be necessary to adopt a general equilibrium 
framework of growth in agriculture and non-agriculture and to complement data on rental partners and 
rental restrictions used here with measures of tenure security. This is a challenging research agenda.  
                                                 
21 The magnitude of these impacts significantly exceeds those commonly estimated to arise from altering the bargaining power within a 
given contract, thus suggesting that studying determinants of rental market participation may usefully complement the large literature on 
contract choice. 
  16Table 1: Descriptive statistics  
  Entire   By Regions 
 Sample  N&NE  Coastal  Centre  SW 
Household characteristics & rental 
participation        
Household  size  3.94  3.89 3.69 4.14 4.03 
Members  aged  15-60  years  2.99  2.97 2.88 3.15 2.93 
Head’s  age  46.56  46.85 46.34 46.59 46.25 
Head with secondary education (%)  52.12  58.98  55.31  45.12  45.84 
Head with high school education  (%)  18.30  21.02 23.74 17.62  9.41 
Households renting in (%) 13.49  10.72  8.43  20.50  14.55 
Households renting out (%)  9.81  6.15  10.76 13.68 10.53 
Assets and income        
Total owned land (mu)  6.24  8.41 5.29 5.51 4.31 
Owned land per capita (mu)  1.68  2.30  1.49  1.42  1.13 
Value of total assets (Y)  27166  29992  36183  24244  17404 
Per  capita  income  2983  3022 4184 2677 2158 
 of which from agri. (%)  58.38  60.91  49.42  57.59  63.43 
 of which from wage (%) 15.00  18.32  22.88  7.96  10.43 
 of which from migration (%)   11.21  6.42  9.98  16.77  13.85 
 of which from non-farm self emp.(%)  10.92  10.8  13.11  12.03  7.73 
 of which from transfer (%)  4.49  3.55  4.61  5.65  4.57 
Renting in         
Renting in from relative (%)   39.32  58.59 25.86 35.08 54.43 
Share with contract, incl. oral ones (%)  59.44  37.84 57.08 66.50 55.70 
Share of contracts, written  7.78  18.46  24.44  1.67  3.41 
Share with fixed term (%)  24.15  30.61 29.20 21.08 22.78 
 if yes, length of term (years)  2.71  3.82 3.80 2.11 1.57 
Renting out         
Renting out to relative (%)   31.04  55.81 24.29 23.18 64.58 
Share with contract, incl. oral ones (%)  59.29  22.73 50.00 75.00 47.92 
Share of contracts, written  8.63  0.00  13.89  6.55  13.04 
Share with fixed term (%)  26.61  34.09 22.14 28.77 22.92 
 if yes, length of term (years)  2.92  1.60 3.06 3.19 2.73 
Village characteristics & land policy         
Village per capita land endow.  (mu)  1.33  1.84 1.30 1.02 0.88 
Villager per capita income  (Y)  2256.26  2306.15 3229.46 1930.47 1649.44 
Share of members migrating  (%)  17.83  10.05 17.07 24.85 22.03 
 Of which, % migrating out of province  39.61  27.27  17.60  61.08  51.03 
Have  land  certificate  (%)  81.16  73.92 83.05 81.33 92.02 
Renting to outsiders not allowed (%)  13.53  16.60  25.74  6.90  4.83 
Uncultivated land taken away (%)  9.74  9.08  15.72  10.22  4.09 
No  of  observations  19570  6622 3533 5187 4228 
Source: Own computation from NBS/World Bank land market survey 
 
  17Table 2: Main income source of households leasing out before and after land transfer  
 Before 
After  Agric. production  Local non-farm  Migration  Total 
Agric. production  15.91%  0.63%  0.18%  16.73% 
Local  non-farm  8.32% 19.80% 0.45% 28.57% 
Migration 32.91%  2.62%  19.17%  54.70% 
Total 57.14%  23.06%  19.80%  100.00% 




Table 3: Per capita income households leasing in and leasing out before and after transfer  
Households leasing out  
  Before  
After   <1500 Y  1500-3000 Y  3000-5000 Y  >5000 Y  Total 
<1500  Y  9.84% 0.63% 0.09% 0.00%  10.56% 
1500-3000 Y  17.42%  24.82%  0.09%  0.00%  42.33% 
3000-5000  Y  1.81% 15.97%  12.82% 0.09% 30.69% 
>5000  Y  1.08% 1.99% 6.95% 6.41%  16.43% 
Total  30.14% 43.41% 19.95%  6.50% 100.00% 
Households leasing in  
 Before   
After   <1500 Y  1500-3000 Y  3000-5000 Y  >5000 Y  Total 
<1500  Y 10.57%  0.00% 0.00% 0.00%  10.57% 
1500-3000 Y  10.34%  36.78%  0.69%  0.00%  47.82% 
3000-5000  Y  0.00% 15.17%  17.01% 0.69% 32.87% 
>5000  Y  0.00% 0.00% 4.60% 4.14% 8.74% 
Total  20.92% 51.95% 22.30%  4.83% 100.00% 
Source: Own calculation based on NBS/World Bank survey (landlords’ and tenants’ assessments for 1106 contracts).  
  18Table 4: Productivity gains from land rental  
  Total  Renting to  
 Sample  Relative  Non-relative 
Tenants’ assessment     
Profit before transfer (Y/mu)  317.65     
Profit after transfer (Y/mu)  584.74     
Productivity gain through rental (Y/mu)   267.09     
Productivity gain through rental (%)  84.08     
 of which to tenant (%)  65.33     
 of which to owner (%)  34.67     
Land owners’ assessment     
Profit generated by owner before transfer (Y/mu)  340.93  326.25  347.60 
Profit after transfer (Y/mu)  623.9  512.08  685.99 
Productivity increase through rental (Y/mu)   282.97  185.83  339.39 
Productivity gain through rental (%)  83.00  56.96  97.35 
 of which to tenant (%)  65.46  69.03  65.88 
 of which to owner (%)  34.47  30.97  34.12 
Actual & perceived constraints to rental      
Tenants rationed in the past (%)  39.02    
Tenants thinking RLCL improved market functioning  81.34    
Owners rationed in the past (%)  12.24     
Owners thinking RLCL improved market functioning  81.44    
Tenants having doubts about future (%)  44.54     
Owners having doubts about future (%)  22.98     
No. of observations   1149  140  311 
Source: Own calculation based on NBS/World Bank survey 
  19Table 5: Determinants of land rental market participation  
  Specification 
  Without ability  With ability  With ability
221 




















































Lower bound equation (lease out to autarky) 
 
   






























Upper bound equation (autarky to lease-in) 
 
    






























Log-likelihood  -13032.05 -12070.83 -11754.68 
No. of observations  19,570  18,390  17,969 
Note: Dummies for time and provinces included but not reported. Adjusted for clustering at village level.  
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
                                                 
22 Using only ability estimate derived from household-year combinations that do not involve any rental to avoid bias. 
  20Table 6.  Effects of changes in independent variables on probability of renting in or out  
    Change in probability of  
Variable  Scenario   renting in  renting out 
Main equation variables     
Farming ability  Mean to max  0.269  -0.07 
Land endowment  Mean to max  -0.122  0.398 
No. of members 15-60  Mean to max  0.035  -0.021 
Total assets  Mean to max  -0.024  0.020 
Village per capita income  Mean to max  -0.027  0.023 
Threshold equation variables     
Migration share   Mean to max  0.176  0.061 
Village land  Mean to max  0.159  -0.035 
Share of households with certificate
   0 to 1    0.0112 
Renting to outsider restricted  0 to 1    -0.0130 
Taking back uncultivated land  0 to 1  0.028  0.037 
Note: Blanks imply that the coefficient is insignificant.  
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Appendix table 1: Household and village characteristics by rental status 
  Type of household  
  Rent-in   Autarkic   Rent-out  
Household characteristics      
Owned land (mu)  5.60***  6.18  7.65*** 
Owned land per capita (mu)  1.47***  1.67  2.10*** 
Household size  4.02*  3.94  3.87* 
Members 15-60 years old  3.06*  2.99  2.90* 
Head’s age  45.82**  46.62  47.11** 
Head with secondary education. (%)  50.09**  52.88  48.62*** 
Head with high school education. (%)  16.47*  18.74  17.21*** 
Assets and income     
Value of total assets (Y)  24,039***  27,417  29,467*** 
Per capital net income (Y)  2734.14***  3003.06  3168.60*** 
Share of income from agriculture (%)  64.73***  61.00  53.06*** 
Share of inc. from wage (%)  7.31***  11.85  12.29*** 
Share of inc. from migration (%)   18.78*  17.98  23.65*** 
Share of inc. non-farm self emp.(%)  9.17  9.17  11.01** 
Agricultural Ability  0.049  -0.016  -0.007 
Source: Own computation from NBS/World Bank land market survey.  
t-test compares means between sub-group and autarky; *, **, *** imply significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
  22Appendix table 2: Coefficients from Cobb-Douglas Crop Production Function (OLS and panel) 
 OLS  Fixed-effect 
































Household-year observations  50234  50234 
Households   13125 
R-squared 0.60  0.32 
Year dummies included but nore reported. Robust t statistics in parentheses.  
*  significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
 
 
  23Annex 1: Proofs for main propositions 
 
Proposition 1: The amount of land rented in (out) is strictly increasing (decreasing) in households’ agricultural 
ability, αi, and strictly decreasing (increasing) in the land endowment  i A . Rental markets will transfer land to 
efficient, but land-poor producers, thereby contributing to higher levels of productivity and more efficient factor 
use in the overall economy.  
Totally differentiating both sides of (2) with respect to α (ignoring the subscript to keep notation simple), yields:  
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Total differentiation of both sides of (3) or (4) with respect to α, yields: 
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From (A1), we obtain  α ∂
∂ a l ; substituting this into the (A2), with some manipulation of terms, gives: 
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Thus, for all households participating in rental markets (on either side), area operated increases with ability. The 
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implying that amount of land rented in (or out) is increasing (deceasing) in agricultural ability.   













the amount of land rented in (or out) is strictly decreasing (or increasing) in land endowment.  
 
Proposition 2: The presence of transaction costs defines two critical ability levels αl(TC
out, ..) and αu(TC
in, ..) 
such that households with ability αi∈[ αl; αu] will remain in autarky. Any increase in TC
in or TC
out will expand 
the autarky range, thus reducing the number of producers participating in rental markets and thus the number of 
efficiency-enhancing land transactions. Compared to a situation with no transaction cost, this will decrease 
productivity and social welfare.  
Using the functional form   for the production function, FOC (2-4) can be rewritten as:   2 1 2 1 1 ) , , (
β β β β α α A l A l f a a
− − =
             ( A 5 )   w A l p a =
− − − 2 1 1 2 1 1
1
β β β β α β
and for households who rented in:       ( A 6 )  
in
a TC r A l p + =
− − − 1 2 1 2 1 1
2
β β β β α β
  24for households who rented out:        ( A 7 )  
in
a TC r A l p − =
− − − 1 2 1 2 1 1
2
β β β β α β
Plugging  A A=  into (A5) allows us to obtain 
1 1
1
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la     ( A 8 )  
Plugging   and 
*
a a l l = A A=  into (A7) allow us to derive 
2 1 1
1



















l    (A9) 
Similarly, plugging   and 
*
a a l l = A A=  into (A6) yields 
2 1 1
1

















u    (A10) 
This allows to show that ∂αl/∂TC
out<0 and ∂αu/∂TC
in>0, suggesting that increase in transaction costs reduces the 
number of producers participating in rental markets.  
 
Proposition 3: Increases of the exogenously given wage for off-farm employment will increase the amount of 
land transacted in rental markets by increasing the amount rented out by households with low agricultural ability 
(who will join the off-farm labor force) and the amount rented in by those with high-ability (who specialize in 
agricultural production). This will be associated with a decrease in the equilibrium rental rate which, in a risk-
free environment, will make everybody better off.  
First, we consider the case where there is no minimum labor (la

























































β β α r w A         ( A 1 1 ) ,  
suggesting that optimal operational land size is proportional to farming ability. Denoting by Δ all the right hand 
side terms except α, we can rewrite:   A
*= αΔ           ( A 1 2 )  
With total land in the economy being  A n , the land market clearing condition is ∫ = Δ
α
α
α α A n d . This allows us to 




A n . Substituting this into (A12) allows to solve for A
















































































r .  
The assumption of a minimum level of farm labor (la
c) implies that households who would optimally supply less 
than la
c to agriculture will move out of farming and rent out all their land. The key to solve this problem, is to 
find the critical farming ability (αc), i.e., any households with α< αc will have la
*<la
c (for ∂la
*/∂α >0) and 
therefore rent out all their land. Setting la
*=la
c allows us to solve for αc,  With some manipulation, we obtain: 
c
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A n d , 
plugging ac from (A13) into the market clearing condition allows us to obtain new Δ and consequently new 














































          ( A 1 4 )  
Setting A
**= A   also allows us to solve for another critical farming ability αau, which divides households 









































α         ( A 1 5 )  
Finally, equalizing both the right hand sides of equation (A11) and (A14) allow us to solve for the new 
equilibrium rental rate r
**. With some manipulations, we can obtain an explicit solution for r
** (not reported).  
























, which suggests that, as off-farm 
opportunities increase a larger number of households will drop farm production and rent out all their endowment, 
the equilibrium rental rate will decrease, households who remain in agricultural production cultivate more land, 
and more households will rent in land. 
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